This paper shows how we can combine logical representations of actions and decision theory in such a manner that seems natural for both. In par ticular we assume an axiomatization of the do main in terms of situation calculus, using what is essentially Reiter's solution to the frame prob lem, in terms of the completion of the axioms defining the state change. Uncertainty is handled in terms of the independent choice logic, which allows for independent choices and a logic pro gram that gives the consequences of the choices.
Introduction
The combination of decision theory and planning is very ap pealing. Since the combination was advocated in [Feldman and Sproull, 1975] , there has been a recent revival of inter est. The general idea of planning is to construct a sequence Recently there have been claims made that Markov deci sion processes (MOPs) [Puterman, 1990] are the appropri ate framework for developing decision theoretic planners (e.g., [Boutilier andPuterman, l995; Deanetal., 1993] ). In MDPs the idea is to construct policies-functions from ob served state into actions that maximise long run cumulative (usually discounted) reward. It is wrong to equate decision theory with creating policies; decision theory can be used to select plans, and policies can be considered independently of decision theory [Schoppers, 1987] . Even when solving partially observable MOPs (POMDPs), where a policy is a function from belief states into actions, it is often more con venient to use a policy tree [Kaelbling et al., 1996] , which is much more like a robot plan as developed here-see Sec tion 7.
Rather than assuming robots have policies [Poole, 1995c] , we can instead consider robot plans as in GOLOG [Levesque et al., 1996] . These plans consider sequences of steps, with conditions and loops, rather than reactive strategies. In this paper we restrict ourselves to conditional plans; we do not consider loops or nondeterministic choice, although these also could be considered (see Section 6). Unlike GOLOG, and like , the conditions in the branching can be 'observations' about the world or values received by sensors As in GO LOG, we assume that the effects of actions are rep resented in the situation calculus. In particular we adopt Re iter 's [1991] solution to the frame problem. Our represen tation is simpler in that we do not assume that actions have preconditions -all actions can be attempted at any time, the effects of these actions can depend on what else is true in the world. This is important because the agent may not know whether the preconditions of an action hold, but, for example, may be sure enough to want to try the action.
All of the uncertainty in our rules is relegated to in dependent choices as in the independent choice logic [Poole, 1995b] (an extension of probabilistic Horn abduc tion [Poole, 1993] ). This allows for a clean separation of the completeness assumed by Reiter's solution to the frame problem and the uncertainty we need for decision theory.
Before we describe the theory there are some design choices incorporated into the framework:
• In the deterministic case, the trajectory of actions by the (single) agent up to some time point determines what is true at that point. Thus, the trajectory of ac tions, as encapsulated by the 'situation' term of the sit uation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; Reiter, 1991] • When building conditional plans, we have to consider what we can condition these plans on. We assume that the agent has passive sensors, and that it can condition its actions on the output of these sensors. We only have one sort of action, and these actions only affect 'the world' (which includes both the robot and the environ ment). All we need to do is to specify how the agent's sensors depend on the world. This does not mean that we cannot model information-producing actions (e.g., looking in a particular place)-these information pro ducing actions produce effects that make the sensor values correlate with what is true in the world. The sensors can be noisy-the value they return does not necessarily correspond with what is true in the world (of course if there was no correlation with what is true in the world, they would not be very useful sensors).
The example robot environment
• When mixing logic and probability, one can extend a rich logic with probability, and have two sorts of un certainty-that uncertainty from the probabilities and that from disjunction in the logic [Bacchus, 1990] . An alternative that is pursued in the independent choice logic is to have all of the uncertainty in terms of prob abilities. The logic is restricted so that there is no un certainty in the logic -every set of sentences has a unique model. In particular we choose the logic of acyclic logic programs under the stable model seman tics; this seems to be the strongest practical language with the unique model property. All uncertainty is handled by what can be seen as independent stochas ti � mechanisms, and a deterministic logic program that gives the consequences of the agent's actions and the random outcomes. In this manner we can get a simple mix oflogic and Bayesian decision theory (see [Poole, 1995b] ).
• Unlike in Markov decision processes, where there is a reward for each state and utilities accumulate, we as sume that an agent carries out a plan, and receives util ity depending on the state it ends up in. This is done to simplify the formalism, and seems natural. This does not mean that we cannot model cases where an agent receives rewards and costs along the way, but the re wards accumulated then have to be part of the state. Note that MOPs also need to make the cumulative re ward part of the state to model non-additive rewards such as an agent receiving or paying interest on its cur rent utility. This also means that we cannot optimize ongoing processes that never halt-in fact the acyclic restriction in the language means that we cannot model such ongoing processes without inventing an arbitrary stopping criteria (e.g., stop after 3 years).
We use the following ongoing example to show the power of the fonnalism; it is not intended to be realistic.
Example 1.1 Suppose we have a robot that can travel around an office building, pick up keys, unlock doors, and sense whether the key is at the location it is currently at. In the domain depicted in Figure 1 , we assume we want to en ter the lab, and there is uncertainty about whether the door is locked or not, and uncertainty about where the key is (and moreover the probabilities are not independent). There are also stairs that the robot can fall down, but it can choose to go around the long way rather and avoid the stairs. The util ity of a plan depends on whether it gets into the lab, whether it falls down the stairs and the resources used.
2 The Situation Calculus and a Solution to the Frame Problem
Before we introduce the probabilistic framework we present the situation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969] and a simple solution to the frame problem due to Kowalski [Kowalski, 1979] , Schubert [Schubert, 1990] and Reiter [Reiter, 1991] .
The general idea is that robot actions take the world from one 'situation' to another situation. We assume there is a situation s0 that is the initial situation, and a function do( A, S) 1 that given action A and a situation S returns the resulting situation. 1 We assume the Pro log convention that variables are in upper case and constants are in lower case. Free variables in formulae are considered to be universally quantified with the widest scope.
Example 2.2 We can write rules such as, the robot is car rying the key after it has (successfully} picked it up:
carrying(key, do(pickup(key), S)) + at(robot, Pos, S) 1\ at(key, Pos, S) 1\ pickup..succeeds(S).
Here pi.ckup_succeeds(S) is true if the agent would suc ceed if it picks up the key and is false if the agent would fail to pick up the key. The agent typically does not know the value of pickup_succeeds(S) in situationS, or the position of the key.
The general form of a frame axiom specifies that a fl uent is true after a situation if it were true before, and the action were not one that undid the fluent, and there was no mech anism that undid the fluent.
Example 2.3 The agent is carrying the key as long as the action was not to put down the key or pick up the key, and the agent did not accidentally drop the key while carrying out another action 2 :
carrying( key, do(A, S)) + carrying( key, S) 1\ A i-putdown(key) 1\ A i-pickup( key) 1\ keeps_carrying(key, S).
keeps_carrying(key, S) may be something that the agent does not know whether it is true -there may be a probability that the agent will drop the key. This thus forms a stochastic frame axiom. Note that the same mechanism that selects between dropping the key and keeping on carrying the key may also have other effects.
We assume that the clauses are acyclic [Apt and Bezem, 1991] . Recursion is allowed but all recursion much be well fo unded. The clauses represent the complete description of when the predicate will hold.
The Independent Choice Logic
The Independent Choice Logic specifi es a way to build pos sible worlds. Possible worlds are built by choosing propo sitions from independent alternatives, and then extending these 'total choices' with a logic program. This section de fi nes the logic ICL sc · Note that a possible world correspond to a complete history. A possible world will specify what is true in each situation. In other words, given a possible world and a situation, we can determine what is true in that situation. We defi ne the independent choice logic without reference to situationsthe logic programs will refer to situations.
There are two languages we will use: LF which, for this paper, is the language of acyclic logic programs [Apt and Bezem, 1991] , and the language LQ of queries which we take to be arbitrary propositional formulae (the atoms cor responding to ground atomic formulae of the language LF ). We write f r. A called the action space, is a set of primitive actions that the agent can perform.
0 the observables is a set of terms.
P0 is a function UCo � [0, 1] such that VC E C0, L:: cEC Po(c) = 1. I.e., Po is a probability measure over the alternatives controlled by nature.
F called the facts, is an acyclic logic program [Apt and Bezem, 19911 such that no atomic choice (in an ele ment of C0) unifi es with the head of any rule.
The independent choice logic specifies a particular seman tic construction. The semantics is defined in terms of pos sible worlds. There is a possible world for each selection of one element from each alternative. What follows from these atoms together with :Fare true in this possible world.
3 Alternatives correspond to 'variables' in decision theory. This terminology is not used here in order to not confuse logical variables (that are allowed as part of the logic program), and ran dom variables. An atomic choice corresponds to an assignment of a value to a variable; the above definitionjust treats a variable hav ing a particular value as a proposition (not imposing any particu lar syntax); the syntactic restrictions and the semantic construction ensure that the values of a variable are mutually exclusive and cov ering, as well as that the variables are unconditionally independent (see [Poole, 1993)) A Framework for Decision-Theoretic Planning 439 Definition 3.3 If S is a set of sets, a selector function on Sis a mapping T : S � US such that T(S) E S for all S E S. The range of selector function T, written R(T) is the set { T(S) : S E S}.
Definition 3.4 Given ICLsc theory {C0, A, 0, Po, F), for each selector function T on C0 there is a possible world w.,-. Iff is a formula in language C.q, and Wr is a possible world, we write w.,-f= f (read f is true in possible world Wr) if FU 'R(T) 'r-f.
The existence and uniqueness of the model follows from the acyclicity of the logic program [Apt and Bezem, 1991] .
Axiomatising utility
Given the definition of an ICLsc theory, we can write rules for utility. We assume that the utility depends on the situa tion that the robot ends up in and the possible world. In par ticular we allow for rules that imply utility(U, S), which is true in a possible world if the utility is U for situation S in that world. The utility depends on what is true in the state defined by the situation and the world-thus we write rules that imply utility. This allows for a structured representa tion for utility. In order to make sure that we can interpret these rules as utilities we need to have utility being func tional: for each S there exists a unique U for each world:
Definition 3.5 An ICLsc theory is utility complete if for each possible world w.,-, and each situation S there is a unique number U such that wT f= utility(U, S).
Ensuring utility completeness can be done locally; we have to make sure that the rules for utility cover all of the cases and there are not two rules that imply different utilities whose bodies are compatible.
Example 3.6 Suppose the utility is the sum of the 'prize' plus the remaining resources:
The prize depends on whether the robot reached its destina tion or it crashed. No matter what the definition of any other predicates is, the following defi nition of prize will ensure there is a unique prize for each world and situation4: path(riOl, rlll, direct, yes, 10). path (rlOl, rlll, long, no, 100) . path (riOl, r123, direct, yes, 50) . path (riOl, r123, long, no, 90) . path (riOl, door, direct, yes, 50) . path(r101, door, long, no, 70).
Axiomatising Sensors
We also need to axiomatise how sensors work. We assume that sensors are passive; this means that they receive infor mation from the environment, rather than 'doing' anything; there are no sensing 'actions'. This seems to be a better Within our situation calculus framework, can write axioms to specify how sensed values depend on what is true in the world. What is sensed depends on the situation and the possible world. We assume that there is a predicate sense(C, S) that is true if Cis sensed in situationS. Here C is a term in our language, that represents one value for the output of a sensor. C is said to be observable.
Example 3.7 A sensor may be to be able to detect whether the robot is at the same position as the key. It is nm :�liable; sometimes it says the robot is at the same position as �'"-e key when it is not (a false positive), and sometimes it says that the robot is not at the same position when it is (a false negative). The output of the sensor is correlated with what is true in the world, and can be conditioned on in plans.
Suppose that noisy sensor aLkey detects whether the agent is at the same position as· the key. For a situation s, sense(at_key, s) is true (in a world) if the robot senses that it is at the key in situation s-the 'at key' sensor returns a positive value-and is false when the robot does not sense it is at the key -the sensor returns a negative value. The sense(at_key, S) relation can be axiomatised as:
sense(aLkey, S) t at(robot, P, S) 1\ at(key, P, S) 1\ sensor _true_pos(S). sense(aLkey, S) t at(robot, P1, S) 1\ at( key, P2, S) 1\ pl f:. p2 1\
sensor _false_pos(S).
The fluent sensor _false_pos(S) is true if the sen sor is giving a false-positive value in situation S, and sensor _true_pos(S) is true if the sensor is not giving a false negative in situationS. Each of these could be part of an atomic choice, which would let us model sensors whose errors at different times are independent. The language also lets us write rules for this fluent so that we can model how sensors break.
GOLOG and Conditional Plans
The idea behind the decision-theoretic planning framework proposed in this paper is that agents get to choose situations (they get to choose what they do, and when they stop), and 'nature' gets to choose worlds (there is a probability distri bution over the worlds that specifies the distribution of ef fects of the actions). grams of ).
An example plan is:
An agent executing this plan will start in situation so, then do action a, then it will sense whether c is true in the re sulting situation. If c is true, it will do b then g, and if c is false it will do d then e then g. Thus this plan either selects the situation do(g, do(b, do( a, s0))) or the situation do(g,do(e,do(d,do(a,s0)))). It selects the former in all worlds where sense( c, do( a, s0)) is true, and selects the lat ter in all worlds where sense(c, do( a, so)) is false. Note that each world is definitive on each fluent for each situa tion. The expected utility of this plan is the weighted av erage of the utility for each of the worlds and the situation chosen for that world. The only property we need of cis that its value in situation do( a, s0) will be able to be observed.
The agent does not need to be able to determine its value beforehand.
Definition 4.1 A conditional plan, or just a plan, is of the form skip A where A is a primitive action P; Q where P and Q are plans if C then P else Q endlf where C is observable; P and Q are plans Note that 'skip' is not an action; the skip plan means that the agent does not do anything-time does not pass. This is introduced so that the agent can stop without doing anything (this may be a reasonable plan), and so we do not need an "if C then P endlf" form as well; this would be an abbreviation for "if C then P else skip endlf".
Plans select situations in worlds. We define a relation trans(P, W, S1, S2)
that is true if doing plan p in world w from situation sl results in situation S2. This is similar to the DO macro in [Levesque et al., 1996] and the Rdo of , but here what the agent does depends on what it observes, and what the agent observes depends on which world it hap pens to be in.
We can define the trans relation in pseudo Pro log as:
trans(skip, W, S, S). 
where trans(P, W, s0, S) (this is well defined as the theory is utility complete), and p( w,. ) == II P o (Co) CoER(T) u(W, P) is the utility of plan P in world W. p( w,.) is the probability of world w,.. The probability is the product of the independent choices of nature. It is easy to show that this induces a probability measure (the sum of the probabil ities of the worlds is 1).
Details of our Example
We can model dependent uncertainties. Suppose we are un certain about whether the door is locked, and where the key is, and suppose that these are not independent, with the fol lowing probabilities: P(locked(door, so)) = 0.9 P(at(key, rlOl, so)llocked(door, so)) = 0.7 P(at(key, rlOl, s0)junlocked(door, so)) = 0.2 (from which we conclude P(aLkey(rlOl, s0)) = 0.65.) 5We need a slightly more complicated construction when we have infinitely many worlds. We need to define probability over measurable subsets of the worlds [Poole, 1993] , but that would only complicate this presentation.
Poole
Following the methodology outlined in [Poole, 1993] . at( key, R, so) +-aLkey_lo(R, so) 1\ locked( door, s0). at( key, R, sa) +-at_key_unlo(R, so) 1\ unlocked( door, so).
where random((a1 PI, ... , an Pn ] ) means {a1, ... ,an} E Co and Po (ai) = p;. This is the syntax used by our implementation.
We can model complex stochastic actions using the same mechanism. The action goto is risky; whenever the robot goes past the stairs there is a 10% chance that it will fall down the stairs. at(robot, To, do(goto(To, Route), S)) + at( robot, From, S) 1\ path(From, To, Route, no, Cost). at( robot, To, do(goto(To, Route), S)) + at(robot, From, S) 1\ path( From, To, Route , yes, Cost) 1\ would_not_jall_down_stairs(S). at( robot, Pos, do( A, S)) + �gotoaction(A) 1\ at( robot, Pos, S). at( X, P, S) +-X =f robot 1\ carrying( robot, X, S) 1\ at(robot, P, S).
at( X, Pos, do( A, S)) +-X :/= robot 1\ �carrying(robot, X, S) 1\ at(X, Pos, S).
In those worlds where the path is risky and the agent would fall down the stairs, then it crashes:
crashed( do( A, S)) + crashed(S). crashed(do(A, S)) + risky(A, S) 1\ would_f all Jlown_stair s( S). risky(goto(To, Route), S) + path(From, To, Route, yes,_) 1\ at( robot, From, S). Given the situation calculus axioms (not all were pre sented), and the choice space, this plan has an expected utility. This is obtained by deriving utility(U, S) for each world that is selected by the plan, and using a weighted av erage over the utilities derived. The possible worlds corre spond to choices of elements from alternatives. We do not need to generate the possible worlds-only the 'explana tions' of the utility [Poole, l995a] . For example, in all of the worlds where the following is true, {locked( door, s0), at( key, r101, s0), would_not_f alLdown_stair s( so), sensor _true_pos(do(goto(rl01, direct), s0) ), pickup_succeeds(do(goto(r101, direct), s0))} the sensing succeeds (and so the 'then' part of the condi tion is chosen), the prize is 1000, and the resources left are the initial200, minus the 10 going from rlll to rlOl, mi nus the 70 going to the door, minus the 30 for the other three actions. Thus the resulting utility if 10 90. 6 Richer Plan Language
There are two notable deficiencies in our definition of a plan; these were omitted in order to make the presentation simpler.
1. Our programs do not contain loops.
2. There are no local variables; all of the internal state of the robot is encoded in the program counter.
One way to extend the language to include iteration in plans, is by adding a construction such as for a discussion of this issue).
" Note that we really need a second-order definition, as in , to properly define the trans relation ratherthan the recursive definition here. This will let us characterize loop termination.
The addition of local variables will make some programs 
Comparison with Other Representations
One of the popular action representations for stochastic ac tions is probabilistic STRIPS [Kushmerick et al., 1995; Draper et al., 1994; Boutilier and Dearden, 1994; Had dawy et al., 1995] . In this section we show that the pro posed representation is more concise in the sense that the ICLscrepresentation will not be (more than a constant fac tor) larger than then corresponding probabilistic STRIPS representation plus a rule for each predicate, but that some times probabilistic STRIPS representation will be exponen tially larger than the corresponding ICLsc representation.
It is easy to translate probabilistic STRIPS into ICLsc: us ing the notation of [Kushmerick et al., 1995] 
The ICLsc action representation is much more modular for some problems than probabilistic STRIPS. As in STRIPS, the actions have to be represented all at once. Probabilistic STRIPS is worse than the ICLsc representation when ac tions effect fluents independently. At one extreme (where the effect does not depend on the action), consider stochas tic 'frame axioms' such as the axiom for carrying pre sented in Example 2.3. In probabilistic STRIPS the condi tional effects have to be added to every tuple representing an action -in terms of [Kushmerick et al., 1995] , for ev ery trigger that is compatible with carrying the key, we have to split into the cases where the agent drops the key and the agent doesn't. Thus the probabilistic STRIPS representa tion grows exponentially with the number of independent stochastic frame axioms: consider n fluents which persist stochastically and independently and the wait action, with no effects. The lCLsc representation is linear in the number of fl uents, whereas the probabilistic STRIPS representation is exponential in n. Note that if the persistence of the fluents are not independent, then the ICLsc representation will also be the exponential in n -we cannot get better than this; the number of probabilities that have to be specified is also exponential in n. In some sense we are exploiting the con ciseness of Bayesian networks -together with structured probability tables (see [Poole, 1993) ) -to specify the de pendencies amongst the outcomes.
The lCLsc representation is closely related to two slice tem poral Bayesian networks [Dean and Kanazawa, 1989] or the action networks of [Boutilier et at., 1995; Boutilier and Poole, 1996] that are used for Markov decision processes (MDPs). The latter represent in trees what is represented here in rules -see [Poole, 1993] for a comparison be tween the rule language presented here and Bayesian net works. The situation calculus rules can be seen as struc tured representations of the state transition fu nction, and the rules for utility can be seen as a structured representation of the reward or value function. In [Boutilier and Poole, 1996] , this structure is exploited fo r finding optimal policies in partially observable MDPs. A problem with the POMDP conception is that it assumes that agents maintain a belief state (a probability distribution over possible worlds). In order to avoid this, POMDP researchers (see [Kaelbling et a!. , 1996] ) have proposed 'policy trees', which correspond to the plans developed here. The general idea behind the structured POMDP algorithm [Boutilier and Poole, 1996] is to use what is essentially regression [Waldinger, 1977] on the situation calculus rules to build plans of fu ture ac tions contingent on observations -policy trees. The dif fi cult part for exact computation is to not build plans that are stochastically dominated [Kaelbling et al. , 1996] . One problem with the action networks is that the problem repre sentations grow with the product of the number of actions and the number of state variables -this is exactly the frame problem [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969] that is 'solved' here using Reiter's solution [Reiter, 1991] ; if the number of ac tions that affect a fluent is bounded, the size of the represen tation is proportional the number offluents (state variables).
In contrast to [Haddawy and Hanks, 1993] , we allow a general language to specify utility. Utility can be an arbi trary function of the final state, and because any information about the past can be incorporated into the state, we allow the utility to be an arbitrary function of the history. The aim of this work is not to identify useful utility fu nctions, but rather to give a language to specify utilities.
The use of probability in this paper should be contrasted to that in [Bacchus et al., 1995) . The agents in the frame work presented here do not (have to) do probabilistic rea soning. As, for example in MDPs, the probabilistic rea soning is about the agent and the environment. An optimal agent (or an optimal program for an agent) may maintain a belief state that is updated by Bayes rule or some other mechanism, but it does not have to. It only has to do the right thing. Moreover we let the agent condition its actions based on its observations, and not just update its belief state. We can also incorporate non-deterministic actions.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a formalism that lets us combine situation calculus axioms, conditional plans and Bayesian decision theory in a coherent framework. It is closely re lated to structured representations of POMDP problems. The hope is that we can form a bridge between work in AI planning and in POMDPs, and use the best fe atures of both. This is the basis for ongoing research.
The way we have treated the situation cal culus (and we have tried hard to keep it as close to the original as possible) re ally gives an agent-oriented view of time -the 'situations' in some sense mark particular time points that correspond to the agent completing its actions. Everything else (e.g., actions by nature or other agents) then has to meld in with this division of time. Whether this is preferable to a more uniform treatment of the agent's actions and other actions (see e.g., [Poole, 1995b] ) is still a matter of argument.
